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Reflections of Another Bush v. Gore Lawyer
RAQUEL A. RODRIGUEZ*
I commend the University of Miami Law Review for its 2009 sym-
posium on election law, How Far Have We Come Since 2000? As one of
the lawyers involved in the weeks of litigation and recounts that fol-
lowed the 2000 presidential election, I welcome the opportunity to look
back and reflect on what Bush v. Gore1 meant then and what it means
today. In the heat of battle, there was scarcely time to consider the dis-
pute in the larger context of our democracy. I now appreciate even more
what each of us involved in the process (regardless of the candidate we
represented) stood for and what the election officials and many judges
who had to make difficult decisions were required to weigh.2
The 2000 presidential election was my first exposure to election
law, but it was not my last. The experience awakened in me a true sense
of what it means "to be part of something larger than yourself." The high
stakes, the long hours, the urgency, and the uncertainty of treading
through new ground made us all reach deeply for strengths we never
knew we had. Thinking three steps ahead to the next turn of events while
dealing with the present became habit. Strangers suddenly were thrust
together in small conference rooms, hammering out reams of legal briefs
or mooting arguments late into the night as they formed a virtual law
firm in representation of only one ultimate client-the next Leader of
the Free World.
Not an election cycle has gone by since 2000 in which I have not
felt the rush of adrenaline on the opening of the first precincts, wonder-
ing what will happen. For election professionals and candidates, a boring
election day is the best kind of election. But since 2000, it has been
difficult to escape from the many things Bush v. Gore wrought. The
* The author is a Partner at McDermott Will & Emery LLP, a former General Counsel to
Governor Jeb Bush and a member of the ABA Standing Committee on Election Law. J.D. 1985,
University of Miami School of Law. I thank Rachel Mervis, third-year law student at the
University of Florida School of Law, for her invaluable help in the research of this paper. The
opinions here are my own and do not purport to reflect the views, policies, or opinions of my firm,
the Standing Committee, the ABA, any of my former employers, or their respective members or
staff. Any errors in it are solely my own as well.
1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
2. Although I was not directly involved final election contest or the appeal to the U.S.
Supreme Court, I was one of the three lead Republican lawyers in the Miami-Dade recount that
became one of the central issues in Bush v. Gore.
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lessons we learned then are still important today. With the perspective of
time, and the benefit of experience, I offer some thoughts.
ELECTION INTEGRITY IS ONLY AS GOOD AS OUR VOTERS AND
ELECTION ADMINISTRATORS.
Bush v. Gore would not have happened had voters taken time to
read and follow instructions. We all know about the chads-pregnant
chads, dimpled chads, hanging chads, three-corner chads, and the like.
Lawyers for Al Gore argued that the punch-card ballots were to blame,
because the booths on which they rested and which collected the
punched-out chads from prior elections had not been cleaned, making it
impossible for the stylus to penetrate the ballot. What the lawyers and
spinmasters failed to mention, however, were the clearly printed instruc-
tions facing every voter who approached the voting booth. They warned
the voter to make sure they punched through the ballot, checked the
back of their ballot and cleared any hanging chads:
AFTER VOTING, CHECK YOUR BALLOT CARD TO BE SURE
YOUR VOTING SELECTIONS ARE CLEARLY AND CLEANLY
PUNCHED AND THERE ARE NO CHIPS [sic] LEFT HANGING
ON THE BACK OF THE CARD
3
There it was in plain language! Had a few thousand more voters heeded
these basic instructions, the entire recount might have been averted.
The "butterfly ballot" also was blamed for Palm Beach voters who
were claimed to have voted for Pat Buchanan instead of Al Gore.
Despite the fact that the ballot was made available two weeks before the
election, as required by law,4 without apparent objection from any can-
didate or party, democratic activists and others persecuted former Palm
Beach Elections Supervisor Teresa LePore, blaming her for what ulti-
mately was voter inattention. Had Palm Beach voters checked the boxes
they punched against the candidate numbers, they would have avoided
inadvertently casting votes for Pat Buchanan and negating their votes for
Al Gore.
5
The Legislature banished the punch-card ballot from Florida the
following year and required counties to replace it with either optical
scanners or the ATM-like direct recording equipment (DREs as they are
3. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 119 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quoting Brief for
Respondent Katherine Harris et al., as Members of the Florida Canvassing Commission at 12,
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949), 2000 WL 1845986). I recall retrieving a similar
sign from the Miami-Dade Supervisor of Elections office and recall it said "chads" not "chips."
4. FLA. STAT. § 101.20 (2000).
5. The "butterfly ballot" never should have been a reason to protest the election. See Nelson
v. Robinson, 301 So. 2d 508, 511 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) ("[M]ere confusion does not amount
to an impediment to the voters' free choice if reasonable time and study will sort it out.").
[Vol. 64:631
2010] REFLECTIONS OF ANOTHER BUSH v. GORE LAWYER 633
known in the trade), more commonly known as electronic voting
machines.6 It was not long before some voting advocates and conspiracy
theorists collectively sounded the drum-beat that DREs were "bad." One
argument was that they could be preprogrammed in favor of a candidate,
citing theatrical "hacking events" that ignored the security conditions
under which the equipment was stored.7 Others argued that poor calibra-
tion or intentional miscalibration could throw the election in favor of a
particular candidate.8 Still others critics refused to accept any device that
did not instantly spit out a "voter verified paper trail" that could be later
used to challenge the outcome of the electronic tabulation. One Florida
Congressman even sued local election supervisors, claiming that the
electronic voting machines were unconstitutional.9 He lost the battle,
but, as we shall see, he won the war.
The most prominent questioned election featuring DREs involved
the infamous Florida Congressional District 13 election of 2006. In the
end it was nothing more than voters mistakenly skipping over the race
that was at the top of the same electronic page where the high profile
Governor's race appeared.'
The paper trail proponents were never willing to accept that DREs
actually could print out a tape in the event of a recount, as they wanted
voters to be able to hold that paper in their hands. Never mind that the
DREs could warn the voter of an undervote and prevent him or her from
ever casting an overvote (the twin-evils of the disgraced punch card bal-
lot). And forget that more than a few voters likely would not have both-
ered to compare their paper receipt to the electronic screen, much as
their punch-card-using predecessors had neglected to check their punch
cards for hanging chads or accidental Pat Buchanan votes.
In 2008, the DRE went the way of the punch card ballot, more for
political reasons than anything else, as all legal challenges to it in Flor-
ida had been dismissed in both state and federal courts."' Florida now
6. See Florida Election Reform Act, 2001 Fla. Laws 40 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 101.56042
(2002)).
7. See Black Box Voting, Can the Machines be Hacked?, http://www.blackboxvoting.org/
presskit.html#hack (last visited Jan. 23, 2010).
8. See id.
9. See Wexler v. Anderson, 452 F.3d 1226 (11 th Cir. 2006) (rejecting equal protection and
due process challenges to Department of State's rules for manual recounts of electronic ballots).
10. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ELECTIONS: RESULTS OF GAO's TESTING OF VOTING
SYSTEMS USED IN SARASOTA COUNTY IN FLORIDA'S 13TH CONGRESSIONAL VOTNG, DISTRICT
33-34 (2008). The GAO noted: "Absolute assurance is impossible to achieve because we are
unable to recreate the conditions of the election in which the undervote occurred." Id. at 34. The
same could be said for any post-hoc attempt to determine what may have caused an undervote or
an overvote, as we know from the attempts to determine "voter intent" in the 2000 recount.
Nothing much has changed here.
11. See supra note 9.
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has only one permitted voting technology, the optical scanner, but voters
with disabilities still may use DREs. 12
The optical-scan ballots themselves are not foolproof. Supervisors
and election workers may post clear instructions on filling in the bubble,
even on the ballots themselves. Voters armed with pens are capable of
marking the ballot any number of ways that a scanner will misread as an
undervote.13 Checkmarks, X's, circles, arrows, crossed out or underlined
names, "yes," "no," and even numerical rankings can end up on a bal-
lot.14 In a close election, like Bush v. Gore, we may once again see the
iconic picture of Broward County Judge Robert Rosenberg, studiously
peering at a ballot through a magnifying glass to determine "voter
intent." Although the Florida Department of State has adopted a rule of
what markings count or do not count as a valid vote, one can foresee an
intrepid lawyer arguing to a court that a stray ink mark is the equivalent
of a pregnant chad and should be counted!' 5
Optical-scan ballots also can be victims of human error by elections
administrators. In 2008, a razor-thin margin in a local judicial race led to
weeks of litigation.' 6 One of the key moments in the case involved the
sudden discovery of 3,500 ballots that apparently had been misplaced
between the August 26 election and the Labor Day recount.17
Regardless of whether either of these late-discovered votes were
legitimately counted or not, they illustrate again that human error plays a
role in many elections. The error can be either at the election official
12. See 2007 Fla. Laws 30 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 101.56075 (2008)). Duval County
purchased optical scan machines instead of DREs before they became mandatory statewide.
Following a challenge on behalf of the American Association of People with Disabilities, a federal
judge in the Middle District of Florida ruled that the Americans with Disabilities Act requires that
sight-impaired and other voters with disabilities have a right to cast a secret ballot. See Am. Ass'n
of People with Disabilities v. Hood, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (M.D. Fla. 2004). Until one can obtain
certification of another voting technology that can read the ballot to the voter in privacy, DREs
with affixed readers must be provided at every precinct. No one has yet argued that these DREs
have caused any problems in close elections.
13. Not every elections supervisor programs the scanner to alert voters to undervoted ballots.
Therefore, even with optical scan technology, votes may be "lost" despite a voter's belief that he
or she voted for a candidate.
14. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. IS-2.027 (2008) (setting forth the standards for discerning
voter intent on election ballots).
15. In such instances, we would revert to the subjective nature of manually discerning "voter
intent," an exercise fraught with problems. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1269 (Fla. 2000)
(Wells, J. dissenting) ("A continuing problem with these manual recounts is their reliability. It
only stands to reason that many times a reading of a ballot by a human will be subjective, and the
intent gleaned from that ballot is only in the mind of the beholder.").
16. See Jane Musgrave, Judge Orders Recount and Nov. 4 Revote, PALM BEACH POST, Sept.
16, 2008, available at http://www.palmbeachpost.comlpolitics/content/localnews/epaper/2008/
09/16/0916recount.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2010).
17. See id.
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level, or at the voter level.' 8
As the Governmental Accounting Office observed in its statement to the
Congressional Task Force appointed to consider the challenge to the
Florida Congressional District 13 election:
An election system is based upon a complex interaction of peo-
ple (voters, election officials, and poll workers), processes (controls),
and technology that must work effectively together to achieve a suc-
cessful election. The particular technology used to cast and count
votes is a critical part of how elections are conducted, but it is only
one facet of a multifaceted election process that involves the interplay
of people, processes, and technology.
As we have previously reported, every stage of the election pro-
cess-registration, absentee and early voting, preparing for and con-
ducting Election Day activities, provisional voting, and vote
counting-is affected by the interaction of people, processes, and
technology. Breakdowns in the interaction of people, processes, and
technology may, at any stage of an election, impair an accurate vote
count. For example, if the voter registration process is flawed, ineligi-
ble voters may be allowed to cast votes. Poll worker training defi-
ciencies may contribute to discrepancies in the number of votes
credited and cast, if voter information was not entered properly into
poll books. Mistakes in using the DRE systems could result from
inadequate understanding of the equipment on the part of those using
it.
19
Thus, the first lesson of Bush v. Gore is that "stuff happens." The elec-
tion issues that led to the monumental Supreme Court decision play out
on a smaller scale every election cycle. Close elections may bring these
issues to the fore. They get obscured in landslides.2 ° As David Boies
pointed out in his symposium address, one of the lasting effects of Bush
v. Gore is that it "put a spotlight on the electoral process."21
18. I have personal experience with election-day voting problems. During early voting in the
2004 general election, the Personal Electronic Ballot that was programmed into my assigned DRE
had the wrong Congressional race on it. Not finding the name of the candidate I intended to vote
for, I protested to the elections officials, who deleted the ballot and reprogrammed my DRE with
the appropriate ballot. While I confess that I am not a typical voter, my experience highlights the
need for voters to take responsibility for knowing who the candidates are and alerting voting
officials when something goes wrong. Had I not known my Congressman, I may well have either
voted "illegally" in the wrong district, or wasted my vote.
19. U.S. GEN. AccouNTING OFFIcE, ELECTIONS: RESULTS OF GAO's TESTING OF VOTING
SYSTEMS USED IN SARASOTA COUNTY IN FLORIDA'S I3TH CONGRESSIONAL VOTING DisTRicr
11-12 (2008) (internal footnote omitted).
20. It is said that elections administrators pray for landslides on election day.
21. David Boies, Keynote Address, 64 U. MIAMI L. REv. 425, 428 (2010).
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VOTERS HAVE A RIGHT TO A FAIR ELECTION, NOT A
PERFECT ELECTION.
The second lesson of Bush v. Gore is that the familiar mantra the
Democrats chanted "make every vote count" was a fallacy.22 As one
scholar has asked, "how would we know if the voting process functions
properly? '23 Any number of factors can intervene before, during, and
after the election to disenfranchise eligible citizens from voting, permit
ineligible persons to vote, or ignore or miscount votes.2 4
A goal of our political leaders and elections administrators should
be to enhance the elections process to increase the probabilities that all
eligible citizens can register to vote as provided by state law, that only
eligible citizens register, that voters obtain timely and clear information
regarding their polling places and election-day procedures, that only eli-
gible voters vote, that votes are cast only once, that all legal votes are
counted, and that the counting is done under conditions that can be
objectively verified. We also should strive for administrative conve-
nience, certainty, and finality. The challenge for legislators and elections
officials is balancing the former with the latter. The Constitution
requires that legislators and elections officials do not create inordinate
burdens on the right to vote while enacting laws to ensure that elections
are fair, honest, and efficient.
25
If our system falls short on occasion, does this mean that the elec-
tion was unfair or a violation of constitutional rights? I submit that elec-
tions that are the result of random, good faith errors-even systemic
errors that do not result from dishonesty, gross negligence, improper
influence, coercion, or fraud in the balloting and counting procesS26_
are not unfair and that the postelection litigation that pretends to "count
all the votes" does nothing to increase the fairness of the election. This
leads to the third lesson of Bush v. Gore.
22. Nor was it what Gore actually pursued in Florida. In his election contest complaint against
Secretary of State Katherine Harris, he asked only that undervotes from four counties in the state
(Broward, Miami-Dade, Palm Beach, and Volusia) be counted. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d
1243, 1258 n.16 (Fla. 2000) (noting that Gore's request for a recount was made on November 9,
2000).
23. Edward B. Foley, The Analysis and Mitigation of Electoral Errors: Theory, Practice,
Policy, 18 STAN. L & POL'Y REV. 350, 351 (2007).
24. Id. at 351-52.
25. See Burdick v. Takashi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992).
26. See infra Note 31.
27. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 121 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("[I]n the late afternoon
of December 8th-four days before this deadline-the Supreme Court of Florida ordered recounts
of tens of thousands of so-called "undervotes" spread through 64 of the State's 67 counties. This
was done in a search for elusive-perhaps delusive---certainty as to the exact count of 6 million
votes.").
[Vol. 64:631
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JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN DECIDING ELECTIONS CAN
LEAD TO UNFAIR RESULTS.
Perfection in elections, as we all know, is unattainable.25 Yet, in a
close election, the losing side will look for ways to convince the courts
to "do justice" by remedying election errors that may have contributed
to the margin of loss and changing the outcome of the election. The
question arises: in an election, what does it mean to "do justice?"
In Bush v. Gore, four of the seven justices of the Florida Supreme
Court who decided the underlying case, Gore v. Harris, thought this
meant a selective recount of only undervotes,29 and, earlier, all seven
thought it required a judicial alteration of the statutory deadline for certi-
fying the votes.3 ° The Florida Supreme Court reached these conclusions
notwithstanding the lack of a finding below that election officials delib-
erately had disenfranchised voters, had spoiled ballots, or had altered the
counts.31 Nor was there any allegation of fraud or wrongdoing by any
campaigns or their volunteers that could be said to have prevented legal
28. See Foley, supra note 23, at 356 ("One must resist the temptation to say that any Electoral
Error is unacceptable. Politicians sometimes pronounce that one disenfranchised voter, or one
lawful ballot included in the count, is one too many. Despite the rhetorical attractiveness of this
assertion, it is untenable as a realistic standard by which to evaluate the performance of a state's
voting system."); see also Edward B. Foley, The Legitimacy of Imperfect Elections: Optimality,
Not Perfection, Should be the Goal of Effective Election Administration, July 22, 2006, available
at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/faculty/articles/foley-imperfect-elections.pdf (last visited Jan. 24,
2010).
29. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1260-62 (Fla. 2000).
30. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1240 (Fla. 2000) (per
curiam) (Harris 1). The U.S. Supreme Court (9-0) vacated this ruling to permit the Florida court to
remove the "considerable uncertainty" that accompanied its decision. See Bush v. Palm Beach
County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000) (quoting Minnesota v. Nat'l Tea Co., 309 U.S.
551, 555 (1940)). The Florida Supreme Court later reinstated its court-extended deadline while its
opinion in Bush v. Gore was being reviewed. See Harris v. Palm Beach County Comm'n, 772 So.
2d 1273, 1289 (Fla. 2000) (Harris II). Despite the U.S. Supreme Court's instruction to consider
whether the Florida constitution circumscribed legislative authority to determine the selection of
electors and to consider its ruling in light of the deadline set by 3 U.S.C. § 5, the Florida Supreme
Court gave scant attention to either question. Notably, the state court's decision in Harris I created
the very infirmity that required reversal in Bush v. Gore. By delaying the certification date, it also
delayed the filing of the election contest so that the federal deadline prevented adequate time for
remanding the Gore v. Harris decision for development of appropriate standards for a manual
recount. Cf Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1290 n.22 ("We add that we did not extend the deadline for
completion of the manual recounts but made clear only that the date for certification must be set
within a reasonable time to allow for the election contest provisions of section 102.168. As
always, it is necessary to read all provisions of the elections code in pari materia. In this case, that
comprehensive reading required that there be time for an elections contest pursuant to section
102.168, which all parties had agreed was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and to
accommodate the outside deadline set forth in 3 U.S.C. § 5 of December 12, 2000.").
31. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1264 (Wells, C.J., dissenting) ("[Affter an evidentiary
hearing, the trial court expressly found no dishonesty, gross negligence, improper influence,
coercion, or fraud in the balloting and counting processes based on the evidence presented. ...
Historically, this Court has only been involved in elections when there have been substantial
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votes from being counted or resulted in illegal votes being counted that
affected the outcome of the election.
The Florida Supreme Court's decision was a recipe for chaos that
would have led to constitutional crisis as well as threatening the rights of
the state's six million voters.32 First, the Court directed the immediate
inclusion of partial recount results of undervotes from only two coun-
ties.33 Second, it directed only undervotes from all counties be
recounted, not all ballots, or even ballots that registered overvotes.
34
Third, it provided no objective standards by which the recount should
take place.35 Fourth, it created a situation where either no Floridian's
vote would count (due to the inability to complete the recount before the
federal deadline) or where only some Floridians' votes would be
counted if their ballots happened to be taken up earlier in the process.36
Fifth, it directed the trial court immediately to use the Leon County
Supervisor of Elections and his designees to perform the recount of the
9,000 Miami-Dade County undervoted ballots. 37 Far from overstepping
its bounds in halting the Florida Supreme Court's ill-advised recount,
allegations of fraud and then only upon a high threshold because of the chill that a hovering
judicial involvement can put on elections.").
32. See id. at 1270 (Wells, C.J. dissenting) ("This case has reached the point where finality
must take precedence over continued judicial process. I agree with the view attributed to John
Allen Paulos, a professor of mathematics at Temple University, who was quoted as saying, 'The
margin of error in this election is far greater than the margin of victory, no matter who wins.'
Further judicial process will not change this self-evident fact and will only result in confusion and
disorder. Justice Terrell and this Court wisely counseled against such a course of action sixty-four
years ago. I would heed that sound advice and affirm Judge Sauls.' ") (footnotes omitted).
33. Those counties in which the Court directed immediate inclusion of recount results from
ballots in which the machines read undervotes were Miami-Dade and Palm Beach. Id. at 1260,
1262.
34. See id. at 1261-62. Chief Justice Wells, in dissent, took issue with the majority's decision
in Gore v. Harris to direct only the recount of undervotes. See id. at 1264 n.26 (Wells, C.J.,
dissenting) ("Also problematic with the majority's analysis is that the majority only requires that
the "under-votes" are to be counted. How about the "over-votes?" ... The underlying premise of
the majority's rationale is that in such a close race a manual review of ballots rejected by the
machines is necessary to ensure that all legal votes case are counted. . . .It seems patently
erroneous to me to assume that the vote-counting machines can err when reading under-votes but
not err when reading over-votes.").
35. See id. at 1262. This ultimately was the basis on which the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.
See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105-09 (2000).
36. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1272 (Harding, J., dissenting). This gave an immediate
advantage to Gore, who had cherry-picked the counties where he sought the canvassing board
recounts, focusing on counties where he had the electoral advantage.
37. Id. at 1262. All the other county canvassing boards in the state could be ordered to
conduct their own recounts. I have found no commentators who noted the irony that the
Supervisor from a county that switched from punch card ballots to optical scan ballots in 1992
would be designated to develop a methodology for determining voter intent on punch card ballots.
Here, the court created yet an even worse standard-less directive. Moreover, given Miami-Dade's
large minority population and its status pursuant to a consent order as a "pre-clearance" county for
changes in election procedures, it is open to debate whether singling out Miami-Dade voters for
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the U.S. Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore prevented the Florida Supreme
Court from overstepping its authority and, in the process, voiding or
diluting the already counted and valid votes of nearly six million
Floridians.
It could be said that the Florida Supreme Court acted unfairly when
it earlier changed the election deadlines established by duly elected offi-
cials. It also can be said that it acted unfairly when it dictated a vote-
counting methodology it fashioned out of whole cloth. Changing the
rules of the game midstream goes against what we call "fair play" in
America. "We are a nation of laws, and we have survived and prospered
as a free nation because we have adhered to the rule of law. Fairness is
achieved by following the rules."38
Elections essentially are political in nature.39 The judicial system is
ill equipped to engage in the balancing of interests that political deci-
sion-making requires. When it oversteps its bounds, it weakens our
democracy. Then Chief Justice Wells, in his Gore v. Harris dissent, said
it best:
Judicial restraint in respect to elections is absolutely necessary
because the health of our democracy depends on elections being
decided by voters-not by judges. We must have the self-discipline
not to become embroiled in political contests whenever a judicial
majority subjectively concludes to do so because the majority per-
ceives it is "the right thing to do." Elections involve the other
branches of government. A lack of self-discipline in being involved
in elections, especially by a court of last resort, always has the poten-
tial of leading to a crisis with the other branches of government and
raises serious separation-of-powers concerns.40
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore was consistent
with the principle that elections must be fair and that courts ought to
exercise self-restraint against the temptation to insert their subjective
views about "the right thing to do" into the elections process. While
some would argue the decision federalized election law, I suggest that
disparate treatment in the recount created further constitutional infirmities, or at least problems
under the Voting Rights Act.
38. Id. at 1272 (Harding, J. dissenting).
39. By "political" I do not mean "partisan." Rather, I mean that the decisions are achieved by
making policy judgments, balancing interests and executing the law. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.
at 116 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quoting Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 268 n.5 (Fla.
1975)) ("The election process ... is committed to the executive branch of government through
duly designated officials all charged with specific duties .... [The] judgments [of these officials]
are entitled to be regarded by the courts as presumptively correct ... .
40. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1264 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
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the decision stands for a more basic principle that need not lead to a
general federalization of election laws. The majority opinion instructs
the lower courts that they cannot fashion election remedies for some
voters that dilute or eliminate the rights of other voters. 41 And although
only three justices relied on this reasoning, it also stands as a warning to
courts that they must respect their limited role in the elections process
and defer to the judgment of the political branches, be they legislators or
county canvassing boards who are acting in good faith." In short: don't
change the rules in the middle of the game.
41. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109 ("When a court orders a statewide remedy, there must
be at least some assurance that the rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and fundamental
fairness are satisfied.").
42. Id. at 122 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). My reading is concededly more expansive than
the concurring opinion's rationale. Chief Justice Rehnquist restricted his opinion to presidential
elections, where the legislature's determination must be paramount pursuant to Article H, section
1, clause 2 of the United States Constitution. See id. at 114 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("In any
election but a Presidential election, the Florida Supreme Court can give as little or as much
deference to Florida's executives as it chooses, so far as Article II is concerned, and this Court
will have no cause to question the court's actions. But, with respect to a Presidential election, the
court must be both mindful of the legislature's role under Article II in choosing the manner of
appointing electors and deferential to those bodies expressly empowered by the legislature to carry
out its constitutional mandate.").
[Vol. 64:631
